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NakodaAI

Industries

AI for Aviation & Aerospace

Aviation already knows how to govern systems that must not fail. That is an advantage and a complication: the sector has mature safety assurance, and AI does not slot neatly into frameworks built for deterministic systems whose behaviour can be specified in advance.

The position

Most AI in aviation today sits away from the flight deck - maintenance prediction, scheduling, ground operations, crew rostering, demand forecasting and passenger service. The consequences are still operational and, in the maintenance case, safety-adjacent enough that assurance matters.

We help organizations classify AI by proximity to safety, apply governance proportionate to that classification, and produce documentation that sits alongside an existing safety management system rather than competing with it.

What is pressing

Four pressures specific to this sector.

01

Safety proximity classification

The first task is honest categorisation: which systems are safety-critical, which are safety-adjacent, and which are purely commercial. Treating all three alike produces governance nobody follows.

02

Assurance for non-deterministic systems

Existing certification practice assumes specified behaviour. Models that generalise need a different evidence base - validation conditions, monitoring, drift detection and a defined fallback.

03

Maintenance and airworthiness records

Predictive maintenance changes when work happens. Where a model influences an airworthiness-relevant decision, the reasoning has to be recorded to the standard the record itself is held to.

04

Operational data across borders

Aviation data moves across jurisdictions continuously. Processing location, retention and access rights need to be settled at contract stage rather than discovered during an audit.

Questions

What this sector asks first.

Is AI allowed in safety-critical aviation systems?
That is a certification question for the relevant authority, and the bar is appropriately high. Most organizations we work with are not attempting it - their AI sits in maintenance, operations and commercial functions, where the governance question is real but the certification question is not.
We have a safety management system already. Is that enough?
It is the right foundation and the right home for this work. What it usually lacks is treatment of systems whose behaviour is learned rather than specified - validation evidence, drift monitoring and a defined fallback. Those extend the system rather than replacing it.
Where should an aviation organization start?
A classification exercise: every AI system in use, sorted by how close it sits to a safety outcome. It is a short piece of work and it determines everything after it, because governance effort should be concentrated where consequence is, not spread evenly.